Report Issued: 15/07/03 Page Update: 22/07/03 Geneva

On 26 June the Institute for Security Studies and the Centre for Conflict Resolution held a one day seminar titled Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW): A New Approach for a New Era.

The seminar aimed to inform the media, non-governmental organisations and government representatives about the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions and the challenges these international instruments face in the current global security environment. The particular implications of the Conventions for Africa and consideration of how the ban on chemical and biological weapons can be strengthened on this continent were matters of discussion.

Dr Jean Pascal Zanders, Director of the BioWeapons Prevention Project noted that the CWC and BTWC require strengthening if they are to be effective in increasing global security and addressing the perceived threat posed by chemical and biological weapons.

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which was opened for signature in Paris in 1993, prohibits the use and development of chemical weapons. There are 151 States Parties to the Convention, 25 signatory states (who have not yet ratified the treaty) and 18 non-signatory states. He said that the majority of non-signatory states are located in conflict areas in Central and East Asia, the Middle East and Africa. Five states, namely, India, Russia, Albania, South Korea and the United States, have declared their chemical weapons and are in the process of destroying them.

Of concern is the failure of key states to ratify the CWC, including North Korea, Syria, Israel, Iraq, some former Soviet republics and a quarter of Africa states. These countries will remain outside the confines of the treaty as long as they refrain from ratifying it.

Africa remains the most underrepresented continent in the CWC. Of the 48 African states, 36 are States Parties, and are 12 non-States Parties. There are nine African countries represented on the Executive Council of the Organisation of the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW): Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Cameroon, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, and Tunisia.

Zanders told the participants Africa needs to define its interests in the CWC, consider the contribution ratification of the CWC could have on national security and development opportunities. Africa needs to explore opportunities to deal with new security threats, he said. During discussion it was revealed that a lack of capacity to meet the reporting requirements under the CWC is one the main limiting factors to increased participation in the convention by African nations.

Turning to biological weapons (BW), Zanders discussed the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) saying that there are concerns about the effectiveness of current BW disarmament measures to deal with future threats. "Especially with the shift from disarmament to the non-proliferation imperative, the BW threat can never disappear, because even in the case that all of todayıs proliferation concerns were to be resolved, the fear will remain that states may acquire technological capabilities to manufacture BW in the future, " he said.

Zanders said there are a number of generic measures which any state can take to limit the threat of biological weapons. These include investment in the infrastructure and communication technology for emergency services, the establishment of specialised laboratories in geographically distributed hospitals for rapid identification of pathogens, familiarizing all doctors and first responders with unusual diseases in annual refresher courses, specialised equipment for rapid detection and diagnosis for civil emergency services and the creation of sufficient stockpiles of medication and equipment.

According to Zanders, the perception of an increased threat of biological warfare has had an adverse effect on international cooperation. He said that especially in the areas of biodefence countries tended to fear they might reveal the vulnerabilities in their defences against biological weapons, which other states might then exploit. He said that as a consequence of the growing lack of transparency, other states could easily become suspicious of the true intent of these activities.

"In times of crisis these (defensive programmes) could easily flip over into offensive programmes." While it was important for governments to make independent assessments of the biological weapons threat, international cooperation was essential, said Zanders.

Khulani Qoma (Institute for Security Studies)
Chandré Gould (Centre for Conflict Resolution)