Presentation Issued: 20/08/03 Page Update: 20/08/03 Geneva

Presentation by Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, PhD
at the BWPP Lunch Seminar
Geneva, Switzerland, 20 August 2003

1. TRACKING LOCATIONS OF PATHOGENS

   • Require strict records of locations and transfers
     (How many labs had the Ames strain of anthrax?)
   • New pathogens: who should control them?
     (Military access?)

2. ADEQUATE PHYSICAL CONTAINMENT AND LABORATORY TECHNIQUE

   • International specifications needed

3. STRICT OVERSIGHT OF PATHOGEN FACILITIES AND PERSONNEL

   • Poor security record at USAMRIID
   • Strict enforcement of regulations
   • Investigate and license facilities and those with access to them
   • Criminal penalties for violations

4. MINIMIZE NUMBER OF PATHOGEN FACILITIES AND PERSONNEL

   • Source of anthrax letter attack
   • Proliferation makes oversight difficult
   • Determine specific purposes first; eliminate duplication and frills
     (Centralize, concentrate at small number of highly-secure sites
   • Priorities change: jobless biodefense experts in the future?

5. ETHICAL/LEGAL EDUCATION AND SCIENTIFIC CODE OF CONDUCT

   • Patriotism often trumps scruples
     (Societal mores and taboos)
   • Teach international prohibitions and dangers of misuse of science
     (Whistleblowers)

6. OPENNESS

   • Publication of basic research
     (Australian mousepox experiment)
   • Secrecy of biodefense projects is counterproductive

7. MONITORING AND RESPONDING TO INFECTIOUS DISEASE OUTBREAKS

   • Importance of early detection
   • Gaps in outbreak reporting
     (Clinical and diagnostic impediments)
   • Public health response vs. forensic response
     (WHO, UNMOVIC)

This report was presented at the lunch seminar on "National implementation legislation and biosafety issues", Palais des Nations, Geneva, Switzerland