

## RESEARCH STRATEGY FOR PREVENTING BIOVIOLENCE THE INTERNATIONAL WEAPONS CONTROL CENTER (IWCC)

The IWCC is pursuing a research strategy that addresses seven questions:

1. Should a biocensus be conducted -- a census of pathogens, laboratories that handle or store such pathogens, transfers of pathogens and equipment, and incidents of concern? What criteria distinguish categories of bioscience? What should be the obligations of States with regard to a census? What legal authority is best suited for implementing such obligations?
2. Does law enforcement have sufficient authority for bioviolence prevention, response, and prosecution? Who should coordinate a law enforcement investigation in the event of a catastrophic bioattack? What will be the scope of the investigation? How will principles of mutual legal assistance be adapted to meet unique bio-challenges?
3. How can biosecurity principles (lab and strain physical security) be universally standardized? What should be relevant criteria of performance? Who should assess compliance? What mechanisms should be available to build biosecurity capacity?
4. How are bioviolence and natural disease linked in terms of international security? What should be criteria for allocating public resources for unique challenges of bioviolence – how should that allocation be relevant for resources to meet public health dangers generally? How can resource synergies be beneficially pursued (e.g. biosurveillance, improved bio-forensics)? How could law reform (nationally and internationally) facilitate development of rational standards for prioritizing allocations?
5. How can principles of *good science governance* be institutionalized internationally? What standards define *good science*? How could a minimally intrusive reporting system be emplaced to provide evidence that standards are satisfied? Who should make extreme decisions about the conduct of potentially dangerous research? How would those decisions have legal legitimacy?
6. With regard to the risk of State bioweapons programs – What are criteria of suspicion? How can confidence-building measures (CBMs) contribute to security and BWC compliance? If a State is responsible for bioviolence, what should be the consequences? At what point does the *principle of necessity* suggest that preemptive action is called for? What legal authority should determine the action to be undertaken?
7. What should be the institutional arrangements to oversee bioviolence prevention? How can these institutional arrangements be sufficiently dynamic to keep pace with changing risk parameters? What should be those arrangements' legal authority to impel compliance with bioviolence prevention policies?

Any contributions to the intellectual resolution of these questions would be most welcome!

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